What are we thinking about?

Governance, ownership, and financing today are very different from how we were traditionally taught in commercial law. Ownership is increasingly concentrated through funds (private equity, venture capital, or public funds, but managed by a limited number of administrators), rather than through personal structures. No one wants to issue shares or debt as securities anymore; instead, they seek private financing. The securities market has also evolved into a mechanism for overse

Any investor would theoretically wish to leave behind human bias, slow reactions, and instead automate (systematize with predefined rules) their investment decisions. The dream, in short, is to exploit millions of opportunities, however small, through tools that few will possess. The path chosen in finance, mainly for this purpose, is systemic strategies—among them, volatility control. This strategy shows that each investment cycle is defined by collective knowledge that seek

Before there was any clearer regulation of virtual assets (e.g., crypto), statements from various regulators or draft laws, it was initially obvious that the new actors did not want to be, let’s say, traditional. From the start they viewed leverage with great suspicion. But not only that. The structure, in general, was being shaped around having 100% backing of what was collected, and they also did not want to borrow against it. In other words, funds were raised from third pa

The story is somewhat repetitive, at least modern history in the field of financial regulation. As we well know, during the Great Depression the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 was enacted, which, for our purposes, required the separation of commercial banking on the one hand, and investment banking on the other. Before the financial crash, banking was rather lightly regulated and, although it worked to set capital in motion, with the Great Depression its negative external

IPOs are difficult operations to carry out, requiring extensive preparation, the involvement of many professionals, and the deployment of sophisticated mechanisms. The SpaceX IPO has caused some noise for several reasons. But in this case, we want to focus on the mechanism colloquially called Greenshoes. We are referring to overallotment options. The purpose of this mechanism is to stabilize the price for a certain period or amount. Imagine an IPO of 10 shares at $40 each. Th

Options There is a chart called something like “options price structure,” which shows how the pricing structure of options on “QQQ” (the Nasdaq 100 ETF, where SpaceX debuted today) is changing. In this context, there is the so‑called put skew. Normally, put options trade at a higher price (they are more expensive) than call options. This is easy to understand: investors pay a premium (a higher value) for protection against declines, which is precisely the role of puts. On the

This financing mechanism is modeled after a stock exchange. Why, then, regulate something so similar to an exchange in a different way—redundantly—than an exchange itself? The regulation of these platforms is justified because they would allow a low-cost method of raising capital from the public. Substantively, it seeks to foster entrepreneurship. Legally, it seeks to prevent this type of issuance from falling within the regulatory perimeter of stock exchanges. It is also

Diagnosis Apparently, in fundamental terms, the main risk in financial markets is a rapid market downturn as a consequence of the war in the Middle East. Initially, there was alarm, affecting asset prices in general, before balancing out with a rather optimistic economic outlook (stock market, fixed-income spreads, and low perceived risks in economies dependent on foreign capital). Only long-term interest rates have not been affected. The problem with all of this is that the